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Apr 6, 2018

Hidden by Model 3 mess, Tesla's other problem is about to emerge

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(Bloomberg) -- With all the car-making troubles that are hounding Tesla Inc. these days -- from the Model 3 bottlenecks to the furious cash burn -- it’s easy to overlook the company’s SolarCity headache.

But 16 months after Chief Executive Officer Elon Musk kicked up controversy by acquiring the solar-panel installer founded by two of his cousins, its obligations are a strain on Tesla’s finances. The $2 billion purchase came with a $2.9 billion debt load, and a chunk of that is soon coming due. That’s bad timing for a company churning through about $6,500 a minute and trying to stave off the need for another capital raise.

“SolarCity debt may not be the immediate cause of Tesla’s problems, but it certainly isn’t helping right now,” said Alexander Diaz-Matos, an analyst at credit research firm Covenant Review LLC.

Tesla representatives declined to comment for this story. The solar business generated positive cash flow last year, according to the company.

Debt Coming Due

Tesla’s debt runs the gamut -- convertible bonds, promissory notes, term loans, cash-equity debt, asset-backed securities. Most of the total is tied to Tesla the automaker.

Read more: Tesla May Need to Recharge Coffers to Make Model 3 Go

For investors, the focus has largely been on the cash burn linked to struggles speeding up production of the Model 3, the sedan Musk is betting will be the first to bring electric cars to the masses. There’s also fresh concern over Tesla’s Autopilot after the fatal crash of a Model X last month that occurred while the driver-assistance system was engaged.

Tesla shares plunged 22 percent in March and closed at $252.48 on April 2, the lowest in more than a year. They climbed 21 percent through Thursday, after the company stood by its next Model 3 production target and said an equity or debt raise won’t be required this year. The stock traded down 2 percent to $299.67 as of 11:31 a.m. Friday in New York.

Higher Leverage

The SolarCity debt is mostly non-recourse, meaning Tesla doesn’t guarantee repayment; SolarCity does. That’s backed by cash flow and assets. It’s still included in Tesla’s overall debt, though, which is used to determine credit ratings and impacts borrowing costs. Of Tesla’s $10 billion of total debt outstanding, about $3 billion is non-recourse, most of which comes from SolarCity.

Without that, Tesla’s leverage would likely be more in line with that of single B rating, according to Bloomberg Intelligence analyst Joel Levington.

Single B issuers typically borrow at a rate of 5.9 percent, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. Tesla’s bonds due in 2025, which are rated Caa1 by Moody’s Investors Service and B- by S&P Global Ratings, yield about 7.2 percent, according to Trace bond price data. Tesla’s issuer rating by Moody’s is equivalent to S&P’s B- rating.

Ratings Downgrade

Mounting financial pressures, in addition to the Model 3 shortfalls, spurred Moody’s Investors Service’s downgrade of Tesla’s credit rating last week to B3, six levels below investment grade.

In recent months, Tesla’s solar business lost the residential-solar throne to rival Sunrun Inc., a San Francisco-based installer with a market capitalization about half the SolarCity purchase price. Tesla ceded market share as it attempted to boost energy-unit profitability and scrapped SolarCity’s costly door-to-door retail sales strategy.

That was a smart move, according to Ross Gerber, co-founder of Gerber Kawasaki Wealth & Investment Management, which oversees more than $10 million in Tesla shares and options. He criticized the SolarCity deal but is still bullish on the company and Musk. “SolarCity was probably going to go bankrupt,” Gerber said.

While more than 85 percent of Tesla shareholders supported the 2016 acquisition, a loud minority contended Musk engineered it to rescue SolarCity from swelling debt. He was SolarCity’s chairman and largest financier.

Before the deal was completed, Musk tweeted that while Tesla would absorb SolarCity’s debt, he would “pay it personally if need be.”

Last week, a judge in Delaware ruled that shareholders who allege Musk duped them into backing the purchase could proceed with a lawsuit, saying they’d produced enough evidence showing the deal may have been flawed by conflicts of interest. Tesla said in a statement that the allegations are false and that it would take appropriate next steps in the case.

One-Stop Shop

For his part, Musk hasn’t wavered from his commitment to turn Tesla into a one-stop shop selling solar panels to capture power, devices to store the energy and cars that can be charged in the garage. The company started producing photovoltaic glass tiles in December at a factory in Buffalo, New York, and has begun selling solar at some of its own stores and through retailer Home Depot Inc.

In the meantime, the bills have to be paid.

“SolarCity debt, in and of itself, is a burden,” said Hitin Anand, an analyst at CreditSights Inc. “It is incremental debt for a part of the franchise that isn’t core but that they want to grow.”

(Updates with share move in the seventh paragraph. A previous version of this story was corrected to remove references to the amount of debt coming due in the first deck headline, fifth paragraph and penultimate paragraph.)

--With assistance from Claire Boston Jef Feeley Brandon Kochkodin Dana Hull David Welch and Jason Feinstein

To contact the reporters on this story: Brian Eckhouse in New York at beckhouse@bloomberg.net, Molly Smith in New York at msmith604@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Lynn Doan at ldoan6@bloomberg.net, Craig Trudell at ctrudell1@bloomberg.net, Anne Reifenberg

©2018 Bloomberg L.P.